Abstract
Introduction

1.
Most of important research on the area of corporate governance literature that discussed on ownership structure with market performance (Berle & Means, 1932; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Gillian & Starks, 2003; McConnell & Servaes, 1990) . It was Berle and Means (1932) who initially contended the distinction between ownership and control in explaining the relationship ownership structure and market performance. According to Claessens et al. (2000) , Ownership pattern can be categorized into either as a widely controlled firm or a firm with controlling shareholders or concentrated ownership. Fundamentally, concentrated ownership can be divided into four categories, that is, widely held corporations, widely held financial institutions, families, and government control. Furthermore, Gillian and Starks (2003) argue that the enormous amount of investments made by foreign and domestic owners motivate them to become more informed and involved owners. Consequently, in firms where foreigners and domestic institutions own shares, the ownership structure creates an economic incentive for informed behavior and presents an opportunity for active shareholders to influence corporate policy and performance. Finally, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors is positive and significant on market performance.
One of the important institutional investors is Government-Linked Institutional Investors (GLIIs), better known as Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLICs) in Malaysia are monitored by federal government. The GLICs include Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (EPF), Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), Kementerian Kewangan Diperbadankan (MFI), Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), and Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) 1 . Among them, EPF, PNB, LTAT, LTH, and National Social Security Organization of Malaysia (SOCSO) established the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in 2001 to monitor the management of the firms that are listed on Bursa Malaysia, to protect minority shareholders interest, and to encourage institutional investors' participation (Abdul Wahab, How & Verhoeven, 2007) . Regarding GLICs, New Economic Model (NEM) has been issued by Malaysian government recently. One objective of NEM is that GLICs especially EPF should divest 10% their stakes in Malaysian market and put them as international markets to create new opportunities for domestic and foreign investors. Therefore, it is important to study the performance of each GLIC in Malaysia.
Another important institutional investor is also state ownership. Unlike GLICs, the state ownership in Malaysia is monitored by state government. The Malaysian policy governs state ownership due to the fact it represents Malaysia people interests including the important socio-political agenda and for the state government as the means to rationalize the distribution of economic resources among different races. Accordingly, companies owned by state should follow distribution of residual performance to their shareholders (Chu, 2004) . Therefore, it is important to study the performance of state ownership in Malaysia.
Other non-GLIIs and state ownerships are domestic, foreign, and family. Domestic and foreign ownerships could play a significant role in monitoring the performance of invested companies. Their ownerships have been found to be related to the greater discipline on executive compensation (Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 2005) and the improved the acquisition decisions (Chen, Harford, & July, 2005) . Abdul Wahab, How, and Verhoeven (2007) argue that institutional ownership that demands good corporate governance would simply invest in companies with good governance mechanisms and avoid companies with poor governance in Malaysia. In addition, Family ownership is common among both privately held firms and listed firms. For example, in South and East Asia, Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, the vast majority of listed companies are controlled by family (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002) . In Malaysia, most of listed companies are controlled and owned by families and those companies seem to be inherited by the founders' descendants (Abdul Rahman, 2006) . Furthermore, Claessens et al. (2000) conducted a study on the distinction between ownership and control in Asian countries (i.e., Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines) and reported that Malaysia ranks as the third highest in term of family owned companies after Thailand and Indonesia. The final important ownership is the one by board. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that higher board ownership improves market performance because it better aligns the incentives of the manager with other shareholders, by reducing agency problems between managers and owners.
Most of studies on the relationship between ownership structure and market performance in Malaysia so far have been focused on Market-to-Book Value Ratio (MTBVR) as a measure of performance (see for example Amran & Ahmad, 2010; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus, & Musallam, 2013) . Given these studies, total investment returns cannot be captured. Therefore, an extended study is needed. This paper is to examine the effect of institutional ownerships on market performance. Literature Reviews and hypotheses 2. Eng and Mak (2003) argue that the costs of agency increased in government-owned companies because of conflicting objectives between pure profit goals of commercial businesses and goals related to the interests of the nation. Estrin and Perotin (1991) argue that government-owned companies do not focus on maximizing corporate performance because the government has political as well as economic objectives, and that corporate performance will be inferior because of weaker governance arrangements. However, Ang and Ding (2006) , Caves and Christensen (1980) , Kay and Thompson (1986) , and Kole and Mulherin (1997) argue that companies with government interventions have better governance practices and improve firm performance.
Several different ways test the performance of government ownership in Malaysia. Lau and Tong (2008) and Sulong and Mat Nor (2010) look at the percentage of total equity of government ownership while Ghazali (2010) focus on government ownership as dummy variable. They found that the effect of government ownership is positive and significant on market performance. Furthermore, Taufil-Mohd et al. (2013) test the performance of each GLIC. This paper will extend the Taufil-Mohd et al. (2013) study by using Total Investment Return (TIR) as measure of market performance to have the clearer picture of total investment performance. Therefore, it is hypothesized that market performance is related to each GLIC.
There has been a debate on the effect of state ownership and the performance of group affiliated companies. Guthrie (1997) argues that affiliated firms with control state ownership could build and improve slacks of resources and however become more diversified. Hence, affiliated firms in diversification could improve firm performance by crosssubsidization among others within the same group (Keister, 2001) . Moreover, State ownership can monitor managers and positively influence firm performance (Le & Buck, 2009 ). Some studies argue that state ownership is detrimental to market performance. Estrin and Perotin (1991) suggest that state-owned companies will not focus on maximizing shareholders value because state has different objectives and political issues, and that market performance in such companies will be lower because of weaker governance arrangements. Qi, Wu, & Zhang (2000) argue that firms with higher state ownership tend to underperform, and that privatization is more beneficial to their shareholders. However, Sun and Tong (2003) argue that a higher state ownership in listed firms has insufficient role to monitor mangers and decrease the performance of the firm. Therefore, it is hypothesized that market performance is related to state ownership. Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that foreign ownership performs an effective monitoring function of the firm management. Foreign ownership might influence market performance due to several reasons. Among them are strong monitoring of managers and reduce agency costs (Stulz, 1999) , providing a wealth of experience in dealing with managerial opportunism, and mitigating agency conflicts in different national and cultural settings which makes them better and more experienced monitors (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) , allowing firms to easily access superior technical, managerial talents, and financial resources (Chibber & Majumdar, 1999) , and obtaining various investment benefits from the government (Wiwattanakantang, 2001 ). However, Wiwattanakantang, (2001) provides two reasons in which foreign ownership affects market performance negatively. Firstly, foreign shareholders face difficulties to monitor managers because of the company is located in other countries. Secondly, most of the firms that have foreign corporations as their controlling shareholders are run by professional managers who do not owned any stake in the firms. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) , Sun and Tong (2003) , and Piesse, Filatotchev, and Lien (2005) find that the effect of foreign ownership is positive on market performance. In contrast, Lau and Tong (2008) find foreign ownership is not associated with market performance. Thus, it is hypothesized that market performance is related to foreign ownership. Domestic ownership is more likely to vote in and contribute to management decisions based on share of their ownership (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988) and attempt to effect the top management to manage for long-term interests of shareholders (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988) . Pound (1988) argues that the positive impact occurs when institutional investor or domestic ownership plays more efficient role in monitoring managers than individual and when it has a greater expertise to monitor the company at lower costs than individual investor does. In contrast, he argues that the negative impact occurs when institutional investor or domestic ownership conspires with company managers against their own fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries. Douma, George, & Kabir (2006) , Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) , Piesse et al. (2005) , and Wei and Varela (2003) find that performance is positively related to domestic ownership while Wei, Xie, and Zhang (2005) find that performance is negatively related to domestic ownership. Thus, it is hypothesized that market performance is related to domestic ownership.
Family-owned firms represent a highest percentage of shareholders ownership that have a good incentive market structure, a strong voice in a company, and a powerful motivation to see that the companies succeed (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) . Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) , Fama and Jensen (1983) , Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , James (1999) , and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that family ownership has a better monitoring system that leads to reduce agency costs and enhance market performance. Amran and Ahmad (2010) , Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Saito (2008) , Piesse et al. (2005) , and Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that the impact of family ownership is positive on market performance. In addition, Amran and Ahmad (2010) and Saito (2008) argue that family-owned firms are better monitoring than non-family-owned firms and lead to enhance firm performance. However, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find that the impact of family ownership is negative on market performance. In contrast, Chang (2003) and Randoy, Dibrell, and Craig (2009) find that market performance is not related to family ownership. Therefore, it is hypothesized that market performance is related to family ownership. Brickley et al. (1988) claim that when managers and directors take ownership of a firm, they have the motivation to pursue efficient management of the firm and the board is careful in monitoring managers' activities. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that directors and managers need to work consistently to protect their image so as to add value to their human capital in the future. Donaldson and Davis (1994) and Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) support the stewardship theory argument where managers and owners or professional directors do not have any conflict of interest and have convergence of interests with firm goals. Krivogorsky (2006) find that the effect of board ownership is positive on market performance. This result is in agreement with the arguments of Brickley et al. (1988) . In contrast, Haat, Rahman, & Mahenthiran (2008) find that board ownership is not related to market performance. Therefore, it is hypothesized that market performance is related to board ownership.
Research Methodology 3.
The population of the study consists of 793 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia before 31 st December 1999. Because of different statutory requirements and materially different types of operations, 33 banks and financial companies exclude from a sample of the study (Amran & Ahmad, 2010) , resulting with a population of 760 non-financial companies. Out of the population, 190 companies are selected systemic randomly (1 of 4). Relevant variables for these 190 companies are collected from 2000 up to 2009 or up to the year before delisting. This procedure leads to the final sample of 1716 company-year observations. The choice of the period is due to the fact that after Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) more attention to market governance has been paid. The variables include one measure of performance that is TIR is used as dependent variable, five ownership variables, which are GLICs ownership namely PNB, LTAT, LTH, EPF, KNB, MFI, and KWAP, state ownership, foreign ownership, domestic ownership, family ownership, and board ownership, and three control variables which include firm age, firm size, and leverage ratio are used as independent variables. Data on ownership is collected manually from annual reports while the rest of the data are collected from DataStream. Table 1 presents measurements of variables: The natural logarithm of total assets of company i in year t. Firm Age (FAGE it) The natural logarithm of firm age since listed on BM of company i in year t. Leverage Ratio (LEVit) Long term debt divided by total assets of company i in year t.
Panel data analysis is used in this study to analyze the impact of the independent variables on market performance. A panel data analysis is used because it can eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity that exists in the sample (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999) . Using panel data that consist of observations on cross sectional and time series usually gives the researchers a large number of data points, increases the degree of freedom, and decreases the collinearity among the independent variables. Using panel data may also improve the efficiency of statistical estimates (Hsiao, 2003) . Panel data is also used to analyze dynamic change and helps detect and measure effects that simply cannot be observed in pure time series or cross-sectional data (Gujarati, 2003) . This study uses GLS method instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 2 to estimate the panel data regression models (Bozec & Laurin, 2008; Gurbuz, Aybars, & Kutlu, 2010; Peng, 2004; Thonet & Poensgen, 1979; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010) . When a method with OLS does not meet its assumptions that display heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, GLS can be used to tackle these problems. Cook-Weisberg (CW) Where: The variables are described in Table 1 .
Results and Discussions 4.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. The mean value of TIR is -1.139% with the maximum value of 857.810% and minimum is -123.320%. The standard deviation is 60.245%. Meanwhile, the highest mean value among GLICs is 2.332% (PNB) and the lowest value is 0.126% (MFI) with maximum (standard deviation) values of 79.950% (7.448%) and 21.060% (1.289%) respectively. In addition, the highest mean value of non-GLICs ownership is 29.826% (family ownership) while the lowest mean value is 1.252% (state ownership) with maximum (standard deviation) values of 74.730% (21.987%) and 61.880% (6.746%) respectively. Table 3 shows the Pearson's correlation results between independent variables for the 1716 observations. Based on the results, none of the correlation coefficients have reported a value higher than 0.8 or 0.9, which might lead to the problem of multicollinearity (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1988) . The highest correlation is 0.625 between board ownership and family ownership. Table 4 shows the results of OLS and GLS regression. The results of OLS in column 2 show that the method using TIR suffers from heteroscedasticity problem based on CW/BP test that gives value (2376.69) with p-value of 0.000 and also from autocorrelation problem based on DW test that gives value (1.735) respectively with F-critical of 1.903. Therefore, this study is used GLS to tackle the problems. The results of GLS in column 3 show that the value of R 2 is 3.5%, while the value of F-statistic is 4.157 with pvalue of 0.000. Indeed, the effects of PNB and LTAT ownerships are positive and significant on TIR. This result indicates that any increase in each PNB and LTAT leads to decrease agency cost and improve company performance. In addition, the effect of family ownership is positive and significant on TIR, indicating that higher family ownership leads to better performance. The reason of this relationship is that higher ownership by families makes them work harder and take actions that would increase their utilities at the expense of minority shareholders, such as drawing scarce resources away from profitable projects to satisfy their non-pecuniary compensation (Demsetz, 1983) . Furthermore, the impact of foreign ownership is also positive and significant on TIR. This finding indicates that that foreign ownership can monitor and align manager interests to maximize firm value (Ghazali, 2010; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010) . It also indicates that foreign investors may monitor the management of companies more closely in Malaysia, hence, the company performance enhances (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010) . On the other hand, the effects of other five GLICs (EPF, LTH, KWAP, KNB, and MFI), state, domestic, and board ownerships are not associated with company performance.
Robustness analysis is also used in this study to remedy the outliers or extreme observations by truncated variables. Data of extreme observations are truncated if the above variables are more than three standard deviations away from the mean (Chena, Hongb, & Steinc, 2002) . The results of Robustness analysis is summarized on column 4 of table 4. It shows that the results are similar to the one before truncated variables except for that the effect of domestic ownership becomes positive and significant on TIR, while the effect of firm age becomes negative and significant on TIR.
Conclusion
5.
This paper examined the effect of institutional ownerships on market performance using a sample of 190 nonfinancial companies during a period of 2000 to 2009. The GLS method is used instead of OLS method to estimate the panel data to tackle the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. The results of GLS shows that the effects of two GLICs (PNB and LTAT), foreign, and family ownerships are positive and significant on market performance while the effects of other five GLICs (EPF, LTH, KWAP, KNB, and MFI), state, domestic, and board ownerships are not related to market performance. This finding indicates that increase in each PNB, LTAT, foreign, and family ownerships do improve market performance while increase in other five GLICs, state, domestic, and board ownerships do not effect market performance. In practical perspectives, this study provides evidence for policy makers that government's NEM policy is supported to divest five GLICs while it is not supported to divest other two GLICs because the two GLICs have good knowledge of the Malaysian capital market and good ability to monitor and value Malaysian companies. However, that may not be the case with foreign markets. The theoretical implication of this paper is that agency costs may decrease in companies with PNB, LTAT, foreign, and family ownerships while it may increase in companies with EPF, LTH, KWAP, KNB, MFI, state, domestic, and board ownerships. Future research that tries to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership with market performance can also include other control variables to the study such as industry effects, firm risk, and the capital intensity to ensure the robustness of the results. Other market performance measures also can be used as a proxy for market performance such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS), return on sales (ROS), return on investments (ROI), profit margin (PM), and economic value added (EVA).
